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It is standardly assumed that individuals adjust to perceived unfairness or norm violations in 
precisely the same area or relationship where the original offense has occurred. However, 
grievances over being exposed to injustice may have even broader consequences and also 
spill over to other contexts, causing non-compliant behaviour there. We present evidence that 
such 'fairness spillovers' can incur large economic costs: A belief that there is unfairness in 
taxation in the sense that the rich don't pay enough taxes is associated with a twenty percent 
higher level of paid absenteeism from work. 
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It is widely documented that fairness perceptions matter for economic behavior. Various
experiments have suggested that people who nd themselves in situations which they
perceive to be inconsistent with their moral standards or expectations show behavioral
responses that entail economic costs. Agents receiving \unkind" wage oers have been
shown to react by cutting back work eort (Fehr and Schmidt, 2005), the belief that
others don't contribute to charitable funds induces a lower willingness to donate to charity
(Frey and Meier, 2004), and people who think that there is injustice in taxation respond
by increasing their own level of tax evasion (Alm et al. 1993; Andreoni et al., 1998).
This literature shares the premise that individuals adjust to perceived unfairness or norm
violations in precisely the same area or relationship where the original event has occurred.
Social psychologists on the other hand have proposed that the behavioral consequences
of perceived norm violations may be less direct. In a series of eld experiments, Keizer
et al. (2008) nd that \when people observe that others violated a certain social norm
or legitimate rule, they are more likely to violate other norms [...].": Pedestrians are
more likely to steal an envelope from a mailbox when the area around the mailbox is
arranged to be littered with trash, and customers outside a shopping mall are more
likely to disobey a \no throughway" sign when bicycles were illegitimately parked nearby.
Similarly, Mullen and Nadler (2008) nd that when they have experiment participants
read a newspaper article which reports on a court decision that is inconsistent with their
core values, they show higher rates of stealing the pen they were given to ll out the
experiment questionnaire.
The latter examples show that a perception of norm-deviant behavior can have con-
sequences for other contexts and make individuals feel less obliged to show compliant
behavior there, even if this comes at cost of third parties. While the evidence gathered
by social psychologists is intriguing, the economic relevance of such cross-norm or cross-
relationship adjustments { a phenomenon we label 'fairness spillovers' { has not been
assessed so far. To do so, we look at two genuinely economic norms of conduct which are
at the heart of modern industrialized societies: the obligations to work hard and to pay
taxes.1 We evaluate whether individuals who believe that there is a norm violation in
taxation exhibit a lower willingness to comply with the norm to exert eort at work. As
a specic setup, we analyze whether the belief that the rich do not pay their fair share in
taxes comes with higher levels of shirking.
Our suggested fairness spillover meets the conditions which social psychologists say make
1Hard work is seen as a virtue almost universally across cultures, religions and political regimes (Lipset
1992). Likewise, once a state is brought into existence, paying taxes is considered as a citizens' duty and
hence constitutes a widely accepted norm (Locke, 1690).
1the occurrence of cross-norm adjustments likely (Austin and Walster, 1975; Mullen and
Nadler, 2008): (i) people's fundamental or core values must be at stake; (ii) a direct
response is dicult; (iii) some degree of anonymity should be involved such that own
deviant behavior cannot be easily detected or punished. Consider condition (i): The
opinion that the top income brackets should contribute a substantial share to the funding
of public aairs is widely held in societies that adhere to the principle of progressive
taxation. Mankiw (2010) even goes so far as to state that \[t]he question, 'Do the rich
pay their fair share in taxes?' is one of [the] dening issues of our time". Consequently, the
idea that the rich may pay too little in taxes can let emotions run high. A recent Economist
poll on US public opinion inquired how angry people get when they think about \Tax
Breaks for the Rich". Almost half of the respondents answered \Very Angry", about one
fth get \Somewhat Angry" while only one out of ten said they \Don't think about it".2
When it comes to criterion (ii), it could be argued that tax evasion is a natural reaction to
perceived injustice in taxation. This direct adjustment measure has been analyzed in tax
evasion experiments (Spicer and Becker 1981, Kinsey et al. 1991). However, it has also
been argued in the tax evasion literature that evasion often is not a viable option, as the
opportunities for manipulating tax returns are slim for the employed population: Taxable
income is often directly reported to the authorities by employers or other third-party
institutions such as banks, investment and pensions funds (Kleven et al. 2010). While
Kleven et al. (2010) nd lower rates of tax evasion in the presence of such reduced evasion
opportunities, it is reasonable to assume that this lack of a direct adjustment measure
makes the occurrence of spillovers to other spheres of life more likely. Instead of evading
taxes, agents may turn to non-compliant behavior in surrogate areas, where adjustment is
less dicult { in our case by reducing work morale. We consider condition (iii) to be met
because exertion of eort at work is hardly ever fully contractible and therefore entails
various elements of \quasi-voluntary" contributions.
That fairness spillovers may indeed exist can be inferred from situations where agents utter
that they refuse to make any eort above and beyond the call of duty at work as long
as those in charge do not contribute their fair share. This is obviously only anecdotal
evidence for the existence of the hypothesized spillovers and a rigorous way of testing
for their existence is more dicult to come up with, because such individual 'work-to-
rule' strategies are notoriously hard to observe and measure. We therefore propose the
following setup. As a measure of work morale which is easy to observe, and that at
the same time allows us to put at a price tag on the suggested fairness spillover from
taxation, we use the number of days that German employees spend on sickness leave.
In Germany, there is no reduction of earnings associated with sickness spells of up to
six weeks' duration and, for the rst three days of each period of leave, employees are
usually not even obliged to provide a doctor's note. In addition, there are high levels of
2Economist/YouGov Poll, conducted March 22-24, 2009.
2job protection, and we assume that ultimately this legal generosity provides incentives
to utilize it as a means of shirking one's duty when the wealthy are suspected of not
fullling the norm of paying ample taxes.3 The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
provides data on absenteeism and also inquires about the belief that the rich don't pay
their fair share in taxes. A perceived violation of this tax fairness norm is surprisingly
strongly connected to work morale: On average, employees who harbor the perception
that managers pay too little in taxes accrue 20 percent more sick days, which translates
to 1.5 more days absent from work per year. This results holds, even when carefully
conditioning on health status and a rich set of income, personal and job related variables.
The extremely diverse set of control variables that the GSOEP provides also allows us to
test and reject a variety of alternative explanations. While we believe the control variable
strategy to go a long way in correcting potential biases, our research design additionally
implements Rosenbaum-type sensitivity tests. They reveal that any remaining omitted
variable would need to have implausibly strong associations with absenteeism and fairness
beliefs in order to spuriously generate our results { given the large set of covariates, the
existence of such an important unobserved variable is rather unlikely.
While the possible existence of what we label 'fairness spillovers' has gone largely unno-
ticed by economists, the general phenomenon that individuals may use apparently unre-
lated outlets in response to external emotional cues is enjoying increasing interest in the
recent economics literature: Upset losses by the home football team have been shown to
induce higher levels of domestic violence (Card and Dahl, 2009); similarly the incidence
of oenses against police ocers (Rees and Schnepel, 2009) as well as vandalism (Priks,
2010) have been found to be especially high whenever home teams suer an upset loss.
Our result parallels these ndings in that they can all be interpreted to be consistent with
the frustration-aggression hypothesis { deviation from a reference point of expectation
leads to anger which in turn results in adverse behavior. There are, however, several im-
portant dierences. First, the reference point we have in mind is genuinely moralistic or
ethical in nature, thus distinguishing the 'fairness spillover' from the above mechanisms,
which following our terminology could be labeled 'emotional spillovers'. Second, in our
case the suspected triggering event is not a real event but rather a belief. Third, because
beliefs about justice in the world can be considered to form slowly over time, the decision
to reduce work morale because of suspected injustice in taxation is not very likely to be
an immediate and spontaneous reaction to a single event. Finally, our dependent variable,
a proxy for work eort, is a core variable of economic analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the choice of
variables, describes the data and gives some descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents
3This is not to say that everyone on sick leave is a shirker. However, that absence due to illness is not
purely a response to medical conditions is widely accepted in the labor economics literature (Barmby et
al. 2002; Johannsen and Palme 2005; Puhani and Sonderhof 2010).
3the empirical results. Section 4 discusses alternative explanations for the ndings, and
section 5 concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
How do individuals react when their sense of tax fairness is violated? In early 2010 a
man deliberately crashed his airplane into an Austin tax oce, killing himself and an
employee. The suicide note was described by the New York Times as a 'rant against
the government, big business and particularly the tax system [...]'.4 Such drastic violent
acts are rare, but each year the US tax authorities are faced with a substantial number
of threats against employees.5 The problem is so serious that there even is an Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) database of 'Potentially Dangerous Taxpayers', and every year a
number of individuals receive jail sentences as a consequence of making such threats.6
These are without a doubt very direct responses to perceived unfairness in taxation and
fortunately most people will not go to such extremes. However the violent outbursts
may be only be the tip of the iceberg, indicative of a more widespread disgruntlement
with the tax system. Indeed, opinion polls show that taxation is an emotionally charged
issue for most, especially when it comes to the taxation of wealthy individuals. In April
2009, between 51% and 74% of respondents were in favor of increasing tax rates for those
earning more than $250,000.7 When explicitly asked about the fairness of the tax system,
in a 2007 Gallup poll 66% of respondents said they felt that 'upper-income people' paid
less than their fair share in taxes. An even higher share of people (71%) believed that
corporations didn't contribute adequately.8 Given the large share of individuals that is
discontent with the current state of taxation, we suspect that these people don't just bottle
up their frustrations, but rather employ more subtle and indirect measures of adjustment
than the ones described above.
Specically, we test whether the belief that there is injustice in taxation of the rich is
associated with lower work morale. Testing this idea is challenging, as real-world data on
4See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.html.
5The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) has investigated more than 1,000
threats against IRS employees in 2009. See the article in the Wall Street Journal at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704757904575077381781219798.html, and the TIGTA website at
http://www.treas.gov/tigta.
6Guidelines for identifying Potentially Dangerous taxpayers are laid out in Part 25.4.1 of the Internal
Revenue Service's (IRS) Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), accessible at http://www.irs.gov/irm.
7See the Rasmussen report http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/business/taxes/
february_2009/51_say_tax_hike_on_those_earning_over_250_000_is_a_good_move, a CBS/NY
Times poll at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll_Obama_040609.pdf, and a Fox News poll
at http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/030509_Poll.pdf.
8See http://www.gallup.com/poll/27199/americans-say-federal-income-taxes-too-high-unfair.
aspx. As an interesting aside, 60% of individuals felt that their own tax burden was fair.
4beliefs towards justice in taxation and on work morale are usually not readily available.
An exception is the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a large
nationally representative household panel data set.9 This survey includes questions on
tax fairness perceptions and on absenteeism from the workplace, which we use as a proxy
for work morale.
The 2005 questionnaire of the GSOEP asked respondents how they perceive the tax burden
of individuals at the upper end of the income distribution, exemplied by "managers".
The introduction to the question reads: "In Germany, everyone has to pay taxes in
relation to his or her income. Those who earn more have to pay higher taxes (also known
as 'progressive taxes')". Respondents are then asked: "[...] what do you think about
the taxes paid by a manager on the board of directors of a large company? Does he/she
pay too much, too little, or an exactly appropriate amount in taxes compared to other
groups?". There are four categories among which respondents could choose: 'too much',
'too little', 'appropriate', 'don't know'.
The framing of the question alludes to the principle of progressive taxation, which postu-
lates that the individuals' average tax rate should increase as income increases. Yet the
question does not explicitly ask 'is there enough progression in the German tax system?',
and so there is scope for individuals to apply fairness principles other than that of suf-
cient progression. The feeling that the rich pay too little in taxes compared to other
groups may stem from the belief that the rich do not contribute adequately to the tax
pool by taking advantage of loopholes or by at out evading taxes in an illegal manner.
Yet the blame need not be on the rich themselves: agents may just as well feel that politi-
cians fail to implement tax policies that suciently strain the rich and thus deem the tax
system unfair. In the end, while we cannot say which tax fairness principle respondents
actually have in mind, we assume that individuals apply some tax fairness principle when
answering the question.
In table 1 we present the distribution of the belief that managers are taxed too little. We
exclude those who answered 'don't know' and coded the variable to zero when managers'
taxation was deemed 'too high' or 'appropriate'. Hence, the reference group is composed of
people who do not think that managers are taxed too little.10 The rst column of the table
shows that an overwhelming 72% of respondents think that managers are taxed too little.
One might suspect that this view is more strongly held by individuals at the lower end
of the income distribution. In the remaining columns of the table we therefore break this
gure up by income quartiles, by worker class (blue/white collar) and by three dierent
skill-related hierarchy levels within an individual's broad occupation. It is striking how
9See Wagner et al. (2007) for a description of the panel survey.
10Perhaps not surprisingly, the view that managers pay too much in taxes is only held by 6% of the
respondents.
5Table 1: Are managers being taxed too little?
full income quartiles hierarchy in occupation worker class
sample Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 low med high blue white
Yes (%) 72:1 78:5 76:8 75:3 61:1 80:3 75:5 60:1 81:4 68:0
N 3647 680 968 1091 908 602 2228 817 1191 2057
No (%) 27:9 21:5 23:2 24:7 38:9 19:7 24:5 39:9 18:6 32:0
N 1413 186 292 357 578 148 723 542 273 970
Total 5060 866 1260 1448 1486 750 2951 1359 1464 3027
Note: Data is taken from the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel. Sample restricted to those observations used
in the full specications in table 3. The question reads: \In Germany, everyone has to pay taxes in relation to his or her
income. Those who earn more have to pay higher taxes (also known as 'progressive taxes').[...]And what do you think about
the taxes paid by a manager on the board of directors of a large company? Does he/she pay too much, too little, or an
exactly appropriate amount in taxes compared to other groups?" There are four categories among which respondents could
choose: 'too much', 'too little', 'appropriate', 'don't know'. The indicator variable used in this paper drops all individuals
that answered 'don't know'. In addition, all individuals that answered either 'too much' or 'appropriate' are coded as zero,
i.e. they do not think that managers are being taxed too little. The total number of observations is lower in the nal two
columns, as some individuals cannot be classied as blue or white collar individuals.
strongly the belief that managers are taxed too little is also held by individuals from the
higher income and occupation groups. It is held by 61% of the respondents in the 4th
income quartile (compared to 78.5% of individuals in the rst income quartile) and by
68% of white-collar workers (compared to 81.4% of blue-collar workers). We conclude
from these numbers that the belief that managers do not pay their fair share in taxes
is indeed not conned to individuals from low-income groups.11 Quite the contrary, this
view is held by a wide range of individuals from dierent social backgrounds.
Table 2: Days absent by answer to 'Are managers taxed too little?'.
managers taxed too little dierence in
yes no days absent
managers taxed too little (%) 72.1 27.9
Days absent by answer category 8.34 5.58 2:76
(.31) (.32) (.54)
N 3647 1413
Note: Percentage of respondents who think that managers are being taxed too little. Mean days
absent by opinion on manager taxation and t-test of dierence in means of absenteeism (standard
errors in parentheses).  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
If individuals react to perceived unfairness by reducing work morale, they are most likely
to choose an easily manipulable margin of adjustment with low cost and low probability
of detection. In Germany, the number of days absent from work due to illness meets these
requirements, because employees are usually not obliged to produce a doctor's note for
the rst three days of each sickness spell and there is no reduction of payments for spells
of up to six weeks. The analysis will thus use employee absenteeism due to sickness as
the dependent variable. The GSOEP provides the self-reported annual number of days
absent from work due to illness. This question reads "How many days were you not able
to work [last year] because of illness?" Because of the retrospective nature of the question
11Interestingly, even the billionaire Warren Buett publicly points out that his own average tax rate is much
lower than that of his receptionist, a rst indicator that believing the tax system to be unfair at the top
is not conned to working class individuals. See www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/business/yourmoney/
15view.html Similarly, in the YouGov/Economist Poll cited in the introduction, around forty percent of
college graduates declare to get 'Very Angry' when thinking about tax breaks for the wealthy. The same
is true for those with a household income above $100,000.
6we draw the information on work absence from the 2006 GSOEP wave so that we can
relate it to the fairness perceptions collected in the 2005 wave. We exclude self-employed
individuals since our argument for using absenteeism as a work morale proxy does not
apply to them. Figure 1 in the appendix shows the distribution of days absent from work.
It shows that about 45% of the individuals had no absent days in 2005 (the mean is 7.57,
the standard deviation 17.3 and the median 2 days). The second row of table 2 shows
that those who think that managers are taxed too little are absent from work 8.34 days,
while those who think that managers are appropriately or excessively taxed are absent
for only 5.58 days. This \fairness gap" of 2.76 days is highly statistically signicant, and
in relative terms amounts to 36% of the average number of days absent. While highly
suggestive, these observations are consistent with the idea that individuals not only 'get
angry' when thinking about tax breaks for the rich { as implied by the Economist poll
mentioned above { but that behavioral consequences to perceived unjust taxation of the
rich may manifest at the workplace.
3 Estimation results
The descriptive statistics presented in section 2 show a positive correlation between the
belief that managers pay too little in taxes and days absent from work { a rst indicator
that there may indeed be spillovers from tax fairness perceptions to work morale. The
GSOEP provides a vast array of control variables, far beyond what is usually available
in survey data, and this section provides estimates of the association between fairness
perceptions and absenteeism after netting out these possibly confounding factors. Ta-
ble 8 in the appendix gives descriptions of all variables used in the analysis, with the
corresponding summary statistics displayed in table 9 in the appendix. Our benchmark
estimation is the linear OLS case, but due to the nature of the dependent variable, we also
use count-data and Quasi-Maximum-Likelihood methods. These estimates give an idea
of the magnitude of the 'fairness gap', the dierence in sick days between two individuals
who only dier in their assessment of whether or not the rich pay their fair share in taxes.
3.1 Baseline results
The main explanatory variable in all regressions of this subsection is the indicator variable
for whether an individual believes that 'managers are being taxed too little', which we
take as a measure of whether taxation at the top of the income distribution is in line with
a respondent's concept of tax fairness. We expect people holding this belief to respond
by increasing their days absent from work and thus the dependent variable is the number
7of sick days in the year of the survey.12
Table 3 provides the results from linear OLS estimations. Column (1) reproduces the
raw dierential presented in table 2 by using a bivariate regression model: People who
think that managers are taxed too little report on average 2.9 more days of staying
away from work due to illness.13 A rst natural candidate to control for is a person's
individual health.14 It might be argued that the correlation in column (1) is driven
by reverse causality: Those who stay at home due to illness may become aware that
they are net beneciaries of the social security system and therefore always think that
taxation levels are too low. Column (2) therefore adds two indicators of respondents'
health status. Health score is a self-reported assessment of an individual's objective health
status. Respondents can rate their health on a scale ranging from 'poor' [1] to 'very good'
[5]. However, there may be vast dierences in the health threshold that needs to be reached
before a person decides to call in sick. Hence, we also control for the subjective satisfaction
with health status. This variable is coded on an 11-point scale ranging from 'totally
unhappy' [0] to 'totally happy' [10]. Both variables are signicant and the coecients bear
the expected negative sign. They imply that better objective health leads to lower levels
of absenteeism, and that at xed objective health, higher levels of satisfaction with this
particular level of well-being are associated with lower absenteeism.15 Most interestingly,
the dierence in absenteeism after controlling for health is still two full days, compared
to the 2.9 days dierence in absenteeism without any controls.
Individual income is also an important control variable. One can argue that low-income
earners may systematically want higher tax levels for the rich, and that they also have
a higher probability of shirking, as they have less at stake when getting caught. Since
this would bias our coecient of interest upwards, income is included in column (3) along
with other personal characteristics, some of which would be included in a standard Mincer
equation. It turns out that a higher level of education is associated with fewer sick days, as
is advanced age and having children. However, the belief that the tax system at the upper
end of the income distribution is unfair is still associated with signicantly higher levels of
absenteeism, despite the gap being cut down to one sick day. Adding job and rm related
variables in columns (4) and (5) does not further diminish the tax fairness coecient, the
dierence in absenteeism now actually increases somewhat. Longer job tenure and larger
rm size are both associated with higher levels of absenteeism. A possible explanation
12We exclude individuals who report more than 250 sick days, the maximum number of workdays per year.
13The only reason that these numbers diverge slightly is that the descriptives in table 2 are based on the
smaller sample which is used in the full specication (6).
14In fact, if everyone used sick days the way one is supposed to, there should not be any systematic
predictors of absenteeism other than actual health.
15Obviously, both these variables are of a subjective nature, even if the health score variable asks for an
objective level of well-being. We would of course prefer to have a really objective measure, such as the
results from getting a physical at a doctor's oce. Unfortunately, such data are not available in the
GSOEP.
8would be that longer tenure makes it harder for employers to punish shirking due to lay-o
protection laws, while a larger rm size reduces the probability of getting caught while
shirking. From column (4) on, the specications also include 16 indicators for the German
regions and 9 indicators representing an individual's rank in occupational hierarchy { the
former for netting out regional dierences in work attitudes among others, the latter as
further controls for socio-economic status.
The GSOEP allows us to account for some personal attitudes and mental states directly,
rather than using proxies for them. After adding these variables in column (6) the ab-
senteeism dierence increases somewhat to 1.5 days and remains highly signicant. We
control for whether someone is satised with their job, since the job related and rm re-
lated variables we included above may not fully capture workplace characteristics driving
both work morale and attitudes towards taxing the rich. Lower job satisfaction can reduce
an individual's work morale and may be the result of antipathy against own superiors,
whom individuals may equate with the \rich" or the "managers". We also include fear
of job loss, although perceived job security should already be at least partly covered by
the dummies for part-time and marginally employed. Finally, we take into account self-
reported laziness as well as a person's degree of risk aversion, as shirking is still a risky
behavior even under the high job protection levels in Germany. Remarkably, none of these
additional \soft", or subjective, variables show a signicant association with absenteeism,
and the fairness gap remains the same.
In sum, the gap associated with diering perceptions of tax fairness appears very robust
to the specication chosen and hardly changes at all after the inclusion of health and
personal characteristics. The main message of these estimates is that the connection
between tax fairness beliefs and absenteeism, described in section 2, does not seem to be
an artefact of failing to control for these observable characteristics.
The fact that the dependent variable can only take on non-negative integer values means
that OLS is not the preferred method of estimation and count-data methods are a better
t. This is why table 4 presents results from a Poisson model, a Negative Binomial (Neg-
bin II) model, and a two-step Negative Binomial Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimator
(QMLE). While the rst two of these models are fairly standard count-data models, the
third was proposed by Wooldridge (2002) and has desirable robustness properties. The
QMLE estimator is a fully robust estimator in the sense that it does not rely on the
distributional assumption and the variance assumption of the Negbin II model. Only the
conditional mean assumption is needed for consistency.16 In the Poisson model shown
in column (1) all control variables have signicant coecients. However, due to overdis-
persion in the dependent variable { which can be seen from the estimate of 2 in the
two other models { the standard errors produced by the Poisson model systematically









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10underestimate the true standard errors. Inference should therefore be based on the Neg-
ative Binomial and QMLE models.17 Coecients must be interpreted as in a log-linear
regression, and the preferred QMLE model estimates the dierence in absenteeism at 26
log points (corresponding to an eect of 30%), which translates to roughly 2 days of ab-
senteeism { somewhat more than the OLS estimates in column (6) of the previous table
suggested. This again emphasizes the very robust nature of the fairness spillover and es-
tablishes that individuals who perceive manager taxation to be unfair have a much higher
level of absenteeism, even after conditioning on a vast array of possible confounders.
Table 4: Count data methods.
(Poisson) (Negative Binomial) (2-step NegBin QMLE)
managers taxed too little :2262 (0:013) :2575 (0:064) :2558 (0:061)
health score  :4058 (0:009)  :3562 (0:049)  :3566 (0:047)
health satisfaction  :1116 (0:004)  :1067 (0:022)  :1067 (0:022)
Personal characteristics
gross income  :0502 (0:006)  :0527 (0:025)  :0524 (0:023)
age  :0316 (0:005)  :0433 (0:031)  :043 (0:028)
agesq 4:2e 04 (0:000) 4:4e 04 (0:000) 4:4e 04 (0:000)
male  :0772 (0:014)  :0882 (0:076)  :089 (0:070)
children  :0834 (0:012)  :0766 (0:065)  :0769 (0:061)
foreign :0927 (0:022) :0244 (0:125) :0257 (0:107)
schooling  :0524 (0:003)  :0357 (0:015)  :0361 (0:015)
Job related variables
tenure :0257 (0:002) :0191 (0:010) :0192 (0:010)
tenure sq  7:8e 04 (0:000)  5:9e 04 (0:000)  6:0e 04 (0:000)
full time experience  :02 (0:003)  :013 (0:015)  :0132 (0:015)
full time experience sq 4:7e 04 (0:000) 4:4e 04 (0:000) 4:4e 04 (0:000)
part time experience :007 (0:003)  :008 (0:018)  :0077 (0:017)
part time experience sq  4:7e 04 (0:000) 2:6e 04 (0:001) 2:3e 04 (0:001)
part time(a)  :1634 (0:020)  :178 (0:103)  :1785 (0:099)
marginally employed  1:195 (0:050)  :9221 (0:182)  :9255 (0:231)
Firm level variables
20<employees<200(b) :2614 (0:017) :3001 (0:082) :2994 (0:084)
200<=employees<2000 :4618 (0:018) :4746 (0:090) :4742 (0:087)
employees>2000 :4096 (0:018) :411 (0:091) :4114 (0:087)
agriculture(c)  :5878 (0:063)  :3999 (0:278)  :3995 (0:288)
mining/energy :6023 (0:037) :6524 (0:242) :6521 (0:245)
processing :0055 (0:026) :1097 (0:137) :1074 (0:125)
trac/media :0724 (0:024) :2004 (0:131) :1983 (0:128)
construction :2495 (0:026) :1472 (0:143) :1479 (0:156)
wholesale :2196 (0:020) :2161 (0:109) :2152 (0:112)
services  :1115 (0:022)  :0843 (0:105)  :084 (0:099)
banking/insurance :0606 (0:027) :0298 (0:140) :031 (0:118)
public sector :0815 (0:018) :2036 (0:096) :2018 (0:092)
Personal attitudes
afraid to lose job :0041 (0:012)  :0196 (0:063)  :0187 (0:059)
satised w/ job :0064 (0:003)  :0171 (0:016)  :0165 (0:016)
lazy  :0038 (0:004)  :0024 (0:019)  :0023 (0:019)
risk taker :0155 (0:002) :0118 (0:013) :0121 (0:014)
constant 4:933 (0:119) 5:166 (0:657) 5:157 (0:588)
16 region dummies Yes Yes Yes
9 occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
2 3:48 (0:09) 2:52 (0:13)
log likelihood -4.3e+04 -1.3e+04 -1.3e+04
N 5060 5060 5060
Note: The dependent variable is the number of days absent due to illness. Reference categories are: (a) full-time for
'job status', (b) less than 20 employees for 'rm size', (c) Manufacturing for 'sectoral dummies'. Column (1): standard
Poisson regression. Column (2): Negative Binomial regression. Column (3) is a negative binomial two-step quasi-maximum
likelihood estimator (QMLE) implying fully robust standard errors.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
17That a Negative Binomial model gives a better t to our data than a Poisson model is also illustrated in
Figure 1 in the appendix, which plots the predicted distributions from both models alongside with the
observed distribution of absenteeism.
114 Discussion
So far, we have observed a quite robust and stable association between perceived unfairness
in taxing the rich and absenteeism. We have interpreted this nding as evidence that
fairness spillovers are relevant in economic contexts, and non-negligibly so. In this section
we discuss to what extent the presented connection may be explained by mechanisms
other than the hypothesized fairness spillovers. Several objections can be rejected on
plausibility grounds, and we also provide Rosenbaum-type sensitivity tests, showing that
in order to annihilate our main result, any remaining omitted factors would have to exhibit
implausibly strong associations with absenteeism and fairness beliefs.
4.1 'Selsh' explanations
A reasonable objection to the spillover mechanism we have proposed would be that the
link between beliefs on manager taxation and work morale can be a result of individuals
pursuing standard selsh preferences. This would render the label 'fairness spillovers'
inappropriate, since the underlying mechanism would be independent of agents' fairness
perceptions. The plausibility checks presented in table 5 help us shed some light on this
issue. Only the coecient of manager taxation and regressors in excess of the full QMLE
specication from table 4 are shown in this table { column (1) reproduces the coecient
from this full specication as a reference point.
Assume that a belief that managers pay too little in taxes is positively related to one's
own tax burden. Then, the coecient on manager taxation may be confounded with the
following standard neoclassical mechanism: a higher tax rate reduces an individual's net
income or, equivalently, the expected loss from being detected, which calls for higher levels
of shirking. We calculate an individual's average tax rate by taking the dierence between
reported gross income and net income and divide it by gross income. When including this
variable in column (2), the coecient of the tax unfairness indicator remains virtually
unaltered. In a similar vein, the belief that those in charge pay too little in taxes could
be just another way of expressing frustration about one's own career opportunities. In
that case the hypothesized fairness spillover boils down to the notion that expecting low
returns to eort is detrimental to work incentives { a rather selsh argument, too. Column
(3) adds a variable measuring the self-evaluated opportunities of rising up within the rm
hierarchy. As expected, a perceived lower chance of advancing in the ranks of the company
is associated with a higher number of days absent. However, the coecient on manager
taxation remains very similar to the reference specication in column (1). Expectations of
low returns from eort may also arise when one thinks that hard work generally does not
pay in life, e.g. when one beliefs that success is matter of luck. In the GSOEP, respondents
12were asked the question 'What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or
luck'. We use an indicator taking on the value 1 if the respondent chose at least value
(5) on a (7)-point scale ('disagree' (0) { 'agree' (7)). This regressor is added in column
(4) and its coecient is statistically signicant with the expected positive sign.18 Again,
the fact that the coecient of the tax unfairness indicator does not change allows us to
counter the objection that we are just measuring a response to the belief that spending
eort at work is fruitless. Finally, we reconsider the redistribution argument from section
3.1: Perhaps those who are sick often become aware that they are net beneciaries of
the social security system, creating a very self-interested motive to favor higher levels of
redistribution. To the extent that income and risk aversion don't already pick up this
redistributive motive, in column (5) we add a control for the respondent's position within
the political spectrum. Lower values indicate a leftist stance, which can be assumed to
go with a high preference for redistribution, yet such political inclinations do not seem to
be correlated with absenteeism.
4.2 'Complainers' and general pessimism
Another objection is the idea that believing in an unjust world { and the belief the rich
don't pay their fair share may just be a special instance of this wider view { can go with
a general pessimism or complainer attitude which in turn may be correlated with lower
intrinsic work motivation. In this case, the presented results would not be a manifes-
tation of 'fairness spillovers' but should rather be interpreted as evidence for 'emotional
spillovers', if any (which would be interesting on its own since evidence for the relevance
of the frustration-aggression hypothesis in economic contexts are scarce). Column (6) in
table 5 adds a variable which indicates whether the respondent is 'pessimistic about the
future'. From the coecient, it seems that such a disposition is unrelated to absenteeism
and tax fairness. Other individuals may loosely be termed 'complainers' { these are people
who lament about everything. To the extent that such attitudes are not fully captured in
the 'pessimist' control variable, they can still bias our estimates. As a further robustness
check we therefore use a GSOEP question on general life satisfaction. The question reads:
\How satised are you with your life, all things considered? [scale 0-10]". The results
after including this additional regressor are shown in column (7), where the coecient on
manager taxation remains stable and precise.
18This is interesting in its own right. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) introduce the disutility stemming from
the perception that luck determines income in an additive-separable manner, and hence, as having no











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Table 6: Direct reciprocity. Sample split by firm size.
(< 20) (20   199) (200   1999) ( 2000)
managers taxed too little :3211 :3116 :3019 :0663
(0:139) (0:109) (0:109) (0:095)
N 1043 1537 1156 1324
Note: The full sample is split by rm size as measured by the number of employees. All estimations are two-step
quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) implying fully robust standard errors. The dependent variable is 'number of
days absent'. All regressions include the same control variables as model (6) of table 3.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01.
4.3 Direct reciprocity
There is also some concern that the statement 'managers of large companies don't pay
enough taxes' may be an expression of a negative attitude individuals may have towards
managers at their own workplace and that makes them want to 'get even'. Recall that the
survey question asked about the fairness of taxes for managers 'on the board of directors
of a large company', i.e. CEOs. Only a minor fraction of people work for large companies
that actually have CEOs. Consequently, if the fairness beliefs about manager taxes were
merely driven by dissatisfaction with CEOs, we would expect only a small fraction of
workers to believe that managers 'on the board of directors of a large company' pay too
little in taxes. However, more than two thirds of the employees in our sample believe that
managers contribute too little. In the same vein, if our eect were largely driven by direct
reciprocity, we would expect it to be bigger in large companies, which are more likely to
have CEOs. However, splitting up the sample by rm size, we nd the exact opposite.
The coecient is quite strong for the smaller companies, while it is much smaller and
insignicant for the largest companies (see table 6).
An objection to our argument could be that respondents might equate 'CEO' with their
own employer, regardless of the size of their company. If this were the case, then showing
that the eect is strong for employees in small companies is not enough to rule out direct
reciprocity. However, there are more reasons why directly reciprocal behavior is unlikely
to be the driving force behind our results: Above all, we do already control for job
satisfaction which should net out many negative job aspects that could trigger reciprocal
actions against the own employer. We also rule out that feelings of being underpaid may
trigger reciprocal actions against the employer by including a variable which inquired "Is
the income that you earn at your current job just, from your point of view? [Yes/No]" in
column (8) of table 5. While it is surprising that the coecient is insignicant, the main
message is that the mechanism we label a spillover is not merely directly reciprocal in the
sense of being a reaction to employers oering unfair wages.
In the end, we nd little evidence that direct reciprocal behavior is the main driving force
behind our results and therefore stick with the fairness spillover interpretation.
154.4 Tax versus income fairness
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence that a perception of norm-deviant behavior
can have consequences for other contexts and make individuals feel less obliged to show
compliant behavior there. While we focus on the perceived fairness of manager taxation,
the GSOEP also asked its participants "How high on average is the monthly net income
of a manager on the board of directors of a large company? Would you say that this
income has a just relation to the job demands? [Yes/No]". If this belief can be shown
to matter for shirking, then this can be seen as a fairness spillover, too, in the sense that
abstract beliefs about how incomes are distributed within a society matter for mirco-
economic behavior. As can be seen in column (9), the perception of manager incomes
as unfair is also associated with a higher number of days absent, yet the coecient on
manager taxation still suggests a roughly 20% higher level of absenteeism for those who
believe the tax system to be unfair. The coecient is not as precisely estimated as before,
yet still signicant at the 5% level. The imprecision stems in part from a drop in the
number of observations by roughly one third. This is due to the fact that the manager
income questions were only asked if respondents could exactly specify how much they
think managers earn. Due to the diering samples, the coecient on manager taxation
should not be compared to the benchmark in column (1). Rather, in column (12) we show
a benchmark coecient from a QMLE estimation of the specication shown in column (1),
estimated on the restricted sample that results from the non-responses to the 'manager
income fairness' question. This coecient in column (12) is 0.22, and so the drop to 0.18
in column (9) suggests that 78% of the original spillover remain, even when including
another potential spillover.
The fact that tax and income fairness perceptions simultaneously bear a signicant co-
ecient is interesting beyond the idea of fairness spillovers in economics. It allows us to
contribute to the debate whether the tax fairness has any signicance apart from other
normative concepts such as income justice or the principle of eciency.19 Our results
suggest that, while tax fairness and income fairness may well have some overlap, they
seem to be distinct concepts, each of which is associated with behavior at work. What is
more, our results suggest that irrespective of the philosophical question of how these fair-
ness concepts relate to the concept of overall economic eciency, both concepts may be
related to specic individual productivity losses: beliefs that these concepts are violated
19A discussion of the principles of just taxation is found in many textbooks of public nance. For example,
in what could be called the epitome of public economics textbooks, Musgrave (1959) devotes two entire
chapters to tax equity issues. An example that illustrates how dedicated these discussions can be is the
so called Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange. Starting in one, then continued in another journal, Musgrave
and Kaplow debated over four years on whether the concept of horizontal tax equity has any normative
signicance aside from vertical tax equity and on how these equity concepts relate to the goal of eciency.
(The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange refers to Kaplow, 1989, Musgrave, 1990, Kaplow, 1992 and Musgrave
1993.)
16are associated with higher levels of worker absenteeism.
4.5 Sensitivity Test: Simulated confounder
Columns (10) and (11) of table 5 show results when in addition to 59 base specication
controls, we add all the variables from the robustness checks at the same time. This leaves
the coecient on manager taxation unaltered, yet one might worry that there still remain
endogeneity issues due to omitted variables. We therefore conduct a robustness check
based on a simulated confounder in the spirit of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The idea
is to simulate a confounder that is correlated with absenteeism and with fairness beliefs
about manager taxes, and to check the sensitivity of the results to various strengths of
that simulated confounder. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed this method for the
case of a binary outcome, a categorical regressor, and a binary simulated confounder.
In order to use this method for a multi-valued outcome, we follow the suggestion of
Nannicini (2007) of transforming the outcome variable into a dummy variable for the
purpose of the simulation of the confounder. Let Y denote a binary variable indicating
whether absenteeism is above the mean (Y = 1) or below the mean (Y = 0), and let T
denote our binary regressor of beliefs about manager taxes. The simulated confounder is
a binary variable U that has a joint distribution with T and Y which can be described
by the four parameters: p00 = P(U = 1jT = 0;Y = 0), p10 = P(U = 1jT = 1;Y = 0),
p01 = P(U = 1jT = 0;Y = 1) and p11 = P(U = 1jT = 1;Y = 1). Nannicini (2007) and
Ichino et al. (2008) show that the strength of the correlation of the confounder with Y and
T depends on the parameters d = p01   p00 and s = p1:   p0:, with p1: = P(U = 1jT = 1)
and p0: = P(U = 1jT = 0). As suggested by Nannicini (2007) we simulate the confounder
for dierent combinations of d and s, holding the unconditional probability P(U) and the
dierence d0 = p11   p10 constant at predened values. We then include it into the full
specication shown in column (6) in table 3.20
Table 7 shows that even after including very strong confounders we still nd a signicant
fairness spillover. The borderline case is the entry for s = 0:3 and d = 0:5 in the table.
Here, we still nd a positive eect of unfairness beliefs on absenteeism of 0.84 days. In
this case the confounder has a partial eect on the probability of having above-average
absenteeism of 34 percentage points, and on unfairness beliefs about manager taxes of 24
percentage points. To put this extremely strong confounder into perspective: the 'health
20Our procedure is based on the Stata module sensatt by Nannicini (2007). The dierence is that we
do not introduce the simulated confounder into a matching estimator, but into a linear OLS regression.
We also present our results in a slightly dierent way than Nannicini (2007) or Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983). We express the strength of the correlation of the simulated confounder with the outcome and
the regressor not in terms of log odds ratios but in terms of partial eects. As values for the parameters
P(U) and d0 we chose 0.6 and 0.05. These values maximised the range of d and s yielding parameters
p00, p01, p10 and p11 that were meaningful (i.e., bounded between 0 and 1).
17Table 7: Sensitivity checks.
d = 0.1 d = 0.2 d = 0.3 d = 0.4 d = 0.5 d = 0.6
s = 0.1  1.45 1.41 1.39 1.37 1.33 1.31
s.e. 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
A 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.36
M 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
s = 0.2  1.35 1.28 1.23 1.16 1.09 1.03
s.e. 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47
A 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.38
M 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
s = 0.3  1.23 1.16 1.05 0.93 0.84 0.75
s.e. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
A 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.41
M 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
s = 0.4  1.07 0.97 0.82 0.68 0.56 0.38
s.e. 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55
A 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.38 0.45
M 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32
Note: The table shows the results of sensitivity checks in which a simulated con-
founder has been added to the baseline regression model (6) of table 3. The strength
of the confounder rises with the parameters d and s (see text for details). In the ta-
ble, the rows labeled  show the estimated eects of beliefs about manager taxes on
absenteeism after the confounder has been introduced into the regression. The rows
labeled 's.e.' show the associated standard errors. A denotes the partial eect of
the confounder on the probability of having above-average absenteeism, M denotes
its partial eect on fairness beliefs about manager taxes. With rising A and M
the confounder becomes stronger and it is to be expected that the estimated eect
becomes weaker. For each combination of d and s we implemented 100 repetitions
of the simulation. The standard errors are computed as an average of the within-
imputation variance and the between-imputation variance, see Nannicini (2007, eq.
11).  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
score' variable has to increase from 1 (its lowest value) to 5 (its highest value) in order
to generate the same eect on the probability of having above-average absenteeism, and
the health satisfaction variable does not even generate this eect when it moves from 0
(its lowest value) to 10 (its highest value). When it comes to the eect of the confounder
on beliefs about manager taxation (24 percentage points), consider again the descriptive
results from table 1: There, the largest observed dierence between the proportion of
people saying that managers pay too little in taxes was that between individuals with
a 'low' and a 'high' hierarchy in their occupation, and that dierence was roughly 20
percentage points, hence less than the eect of our confounder on fairness beliefs about
manager taxes. We conclude from this exercise that if our result was purely due to an
omitted variable this omitted variable would need to have an eect on absenteeism as
strong as a move from poor health to excellent health, and it would at the same time
need to generate variation in beliefs about manager taxation larger than the dierences
between low-hierarchy and high-hierarchy workers. Given our broad range of included
control variables, we nd it hard to think of any omitted variable that could drive our
results to such an important extent.
5 Conclusion
What are the behavioral correlates of perceived unfairness in taxation? It has been
proposed that people who believe the tax system to be unfair tend to withhold their
18contributions to the tax system, i.e. to cheat on taxes. Building on the argument that
opportunities for evading taxes are rather slim for most individuals, we go one step further
and ask whether people may then try and nd alternative ways of adjustment { specically,
we analyze whether people start to cheat at work when they feel that there is injustice in
taxation. Using a large-scale German dataset, we nd that this link between tax fairness
beliefs and work morale is surprisingly strong. The belief that the top income earners
don't pay their fair share in taxes is associated with at least an 17 percent increase
in absenteeism. The results prove robust to adding standard labor market controls as
well as a wide variety of individual attitudes that may aect absenteeism but that are
not generally available in other data sets. In addition, Rosenbaum-type sensitivity tests
provide evidence that any remaining omitted variable would have to exhibit implausibly
strong associations with absenteeism and fairness beliefs in order to spuriously generate
our results.
The main contribution of this paper is that it adds a new angle to the literature on
fairness in economics. It is standardly assumed that people adjust to perceived unfairness
in precisely the same area or relationship where the fairness violation is considered to
have occurred, yet our results suggest that behavioral adjustments to perceived violations
of what is considered to be a 'just' outcome may be rather indirect, i.e. the cue may
elicit responses across spheres and across certain relationships. Our results indicate that
these 'fairness spillovers' are relevant in a genuinely economic context, and may come with
large economic costs. If we tentatively interpret the association as causal, the smallest
coecient we nd (0.17) corresponds to a monetary cost of 5 billion euros per year in
continued wage payments associated with the spillover.21
More narrowly, our results also raise new aspects concerning the welfare costs of taxation.
Traditionally, welfare eects of taxation are assessed in terms of distorting monetary
incentives. However, our analysis revealed that there are other channels through which
tax policy may have an impact on economic behavior. People have beliefs about fairness
in taxation, and it is these beliefs that may provide an incentive on their own. While
neglecting these fairness-induced costs of taxation bears the risk of arriving at misleading
policy recommendations, it is also important to realize that the implication of this research
cannot simply be higher tax rates for managers or the wealthy in order to avoid this
\extra" excess burden. First, it is unclear whether beliefs about fairness in taxation
correspond to real tax burdens of the wealthy at all. Even if the fairness beliefs emerge
from correct beliefs about the tax system, positive welfare eects at the bottom of the
income distribution must be weighed against possibly negative welfare eects induced by
behavioral responses to increased taxation at the upper end of the income distribution.
21Assuming an 8-hour workday at the average gross hourly wage in 2005 of around 20 euros, and 26 million
gainfully employed. Wage rate and number of employed obtained from the German Federal Statistical
oce.
19In the end, this study can be considered as a pointer that quite likely there are hidden
eects of taxation in areas that have not been considered thus far, and that these eects
can be non-negligible in size.
Several questions are left for future research. It should be interesting to see whether our
nding can be conrmed in other countries or whether this result is a German peculiarity.
At least with respect to the willingness to comply with work norms, Germany does not
seem to be a negative outlier in international comparisons (Hofstede, 1980), and so we
don't expect our results to be upper bound estimates. Still, it would be interesting to
see, whether in a country like the United States, where people believe in social mobility
and in being in charge of their own destiny (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), a link between
perceived unfairness of taxation and work eort can be found, too. It should also be
noted that we proposed just one type of fairness spillover that bears the potential of
being relevant from an economic point of view. A general question is whether there are
other such examples. Our robustness checks revealed that other beliefs about injustice in
the world { such as the belief that income is determined by luck or that managers earn
too much { may deter economic eort as well and hence should encourage research in that
direction. Finally, it is reasonable to ask whether the recent nancial crisis has aggravated
the issue. Believing that the rich illegitimately generate high incomes and enjoy uncalled
for tax privileges may have become even more prevalent during the nancial crisis, and
our suspicion is that the potential economic costs associated with fairness spillovers from
taxation may then also have increased.
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Note: The gure compares the observed distribution of the days of absenteeism with the distributions predicted
from unconditional Poisson and Negative Binomial (Negbin II) count-data models. Due to overdispersion (mean
7.57, overdispersion parameter 4.09), the Negative Binomial model gives a better t to the data than the
Poisson model. To ensure an easier readability of the graph, it is truncated at 30 days of absenteeism (95th
percentile). The 99th percentile of absenteeism is at 85 days of absenteeism, the maximum is 245 days. Number
of observations N=5060.
23Table 8: Description of Variables.
Variable Description
Main variables
absenteeism number of days absent in the year of survey. Asked retrospectively in 2006.
managers taxed too little indicator variable, takes on value 1 if respondent thinks managers are being taxed too little.
health score 'How would you describe your current health?'. Scale: 'Poor' (1) to 'Very good' (5).
health satisfaction 'How satised are you with your health?'. Scale: 'totally unhappy' (0) to 'totally happy' (10).
Personal characteristics
gross income gross monthly income in 1000 Euros.
age age in years.
agesq age in years squared.
male indicator variable, 1 if male.
children the number of children <16 years in the household.
foreign indicator variable, 1 if non-German citizen.
schooling years of schooling (includes tertiary education and vocational training).
Job related variables
tenure tenure with current employer.
tenure sq tenure with current employer squared.
full time experience years of full time experience.
full time experience sq years of full time experience squared.
part time experience years of part time experience.
part time experience sq years of part time experience squared.
part time indicator variable, 1 if currently part time employed.
marginally employed indicator variable, 1 if currently marginally employed.
Firm level variables
20employees< 200 indicator variable, 1 if number of employees at current employer 20<employees<200.
200employees<2000 indicator variable, 1 if number of employees at current employer 200<=employees<2000.
employees2000 indicator variable, 1 if number of employees at current employer >2000.
agriculture indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
mining/energy indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
processing indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
trac/media indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
construction indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
wholesale indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
services indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
banking/insurance indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
public sector indicator variable, 1 if employed in this sector.
Personal attitudes
afraid to lose job Indicator variable, 1 if individual is 'very concerned' or 'somewhat concerned' about job security.
satised w/ job 'How satised are you with your job?'. Scale: 'totally unhappy' (0) to 'totally happy' (10).
lazy 'I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy.' Scale: 'not at all' (1) to 'applies perfectly' (7).
risk taker 'Are you prepared to take risks?'. Scale: 'avoid risks' (0) to 'fully prepared' (10).
Robustness checks
eective avg tax rate 1-(net monthly income in Euros/gross monthly income in Euros).
achievements determined by luck indicator, 1 if respondent gave at least (5) on a (7)-point scale ('disagree' (0) { 'agree' (7))
to the question 'What a person achieves in life is above all a question of fate or luck'.
unfavorable job prospects How likely is respondent to receive a promotion at current place of employment
within next two years? Scale: 'certainly' (1) to 'certainly not' (4).
pessimist indicator variable, 1 if individual states to be either 'pessimistic'
or 'more pessimistic than optimistic' about the future.
life satisfaction 'How satised are you with your life' Scale: 'not at all' (0) to 'fully' (10).
leftist/right 'How would you rate your political views?' Scale: 'Far left' (0) to 'Far right' (10).
own income unfair indicator variable, 1 if respondent thinks her/his own pay is unfair.
manager income unfair indicator variable, 1 if respondent thinks manager pay is unfair.
Other
region dummies 16 indicator variables for the German states.
occupation dummies 3 blue collar indicator variables: low, medium, high skilled,
3 white collar indicator variables: low, medium, high skilled,
3 public servant indicator variables: low, medium, high skilled.
24Table 9: Summary statistics.
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Main variables
absenteeism 5060 7:57 17:30 0 245
managers taxed too little 5060 0:72 0:45 0 1
health score 5060 3:55 0:82 1 5
health satisfaction 5060 7:01 1:90 0 10
Personal characteristics
gross income 5060 2:78 1:83 0:25 35
age 5060 43:02 10:08 18 74
male 5060 0:56 0:50 0 1
children 5060 0:38 0:48 0 1
foreign 5060 0:05 0:23 0 1
schooling 5060 12:87 2:79 7 18
Job related variables
tenure 5060 12:14 10:12 0 48:8
full time experience 5060 16:80 10:91 0 47
part time experience 5060 2:62 5:29 0 45
part time 5060 0:19 0:39 0 1
marginally employed 5060 0:03 0:17 0 1
Firm level variables
employees<= 20 5060 0:21 0:40 0 1
20<employees< 200 5060 0:30 0:46 0 1
200<=employees<2000 5060 0:23 0:42 0 1
employees>2000 5060 0:26 0:44 0 1
agriculture 5060 0:01 0:10 0 1
mining/energy 5060 0:01 0:12 0 1
manufacturing 5060 0:21 0:41 0 1
processing 5060 0:05 0:22 0 1
trac/media 5060 0:06 0:24 0 1
construction 5060 0:05 0:21 0 1
wholesale 5060 0:11 0:32 0 1
services 5060 0:13 0:34 0 1
banking/insurance 5060 0:05 0:23 0 1
public sector 5060 0:30 0:46 0 1
Personal attitudes
afraid to lose job 5060 0:60 0:49 0 1
satised w/ job 5060 7:04 1:92 0 10
lazy 5060 2:20 1:45 1 7
risk taker 5060 4:85 2:14 0 10
Robustness checks
eective avg tax rate 4983 0:33 0:12  0:14 0:7
achievements determined by luck 5043 0:24 0:43 0 1
unfavorable job prospects 5049 3:41 0:67 1 4
pessimist 5048 0:26 0:44 0 1
life satisfaction 5056 7:19 1:61 0 10
leftist/right 4978 4:71 1:74 0 10
own income unfair 5045 0:33 0:47 0 1
manager income unfair 3391 0:75 0:43 0 1
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